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Abstract:  
In this paper we analyze the credit booms in transition economies under different monetary 
policy regimes. We show that incentives for credit demand may differ under various monetary 
policy regimes. It might be consequent to different patterns of economic agents’ behavior at the 
credit market in case of hard peg, but not obviously because of the “less than credible monetary 
policy”. In countries with successful exchange rate pegs an incentive to additional borrowing might 
origin from the lower exchange rate risk and better access to foreign credit markets. Hence the 
credit demand in such countries performs much higher elasticity on income (GDP) rather than in 
countries with monetary policy with the internal anchor, say IT. Furthermore there is a tendency 
that credit markets under exchange rate pegs are subjected to more continuous shocks, while in 
countries with IT the restoration of the long-term path tends to be quicker. Supply factors and the 
mechanisms of the central banks influence on credit market are also different among monetary 
policy regimes. We have also shown that in case of Belarus changing monetary policy will mean 
changing incentives at the credit market and changing the mechanisms of central bank influence on 
it. Furthermore we conclude that switching to a new regime (IT) in Belarus will be consistent with 
further reduction of dollarization in the economy and introducing more effective mechanisms at the 
credit market and these goals are coinciding with each other.  
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Executive summary: 
The paper deals with the credit booms in transition economies under different monetary 
policy regimes. We have shown that incentives for credit demand may differ under various 
monetary policy regimes. In countries with a hard peg credit market has more preconditions for 
rapid shocks and economic agents are more liable to borrow in case of the peg. It might be 
consequent to different patterns of economic agents’ behavior at the credit market in case of hard 
peg, but not obviously because of the “less than credible monetary policy”. In case of lower 
credibility of monetary policy under the hard peg, the incentives for credit demand change and they 
are not so much income-based. From this point of view lower income-based demand may occur 
under any form of the monetary policy that is considered as not credible by the economic agents. 
However in successful exchange rate pegs an incentive to additional borrowing might origin from 
the lower exchange rate risk and better access to foreign credit markets. It is correspondent to the 
fact that such kind of policy as a rule is carried out by the countries that may be classified as small 
open economies. Hence the demand in such countries performs much higher elasticity on income 
(GDP) rather than in countries with monetary policy with the internal anchor, say IT. Furthermore 
there is a tendency that credit markets under exchange rate pegs are subjected to more continuous 
shocks, while in countries with IT the restoration of the long-term path tends to be quicker. 
Supply factors and the mechanisms of the central banks influence on credit market are also 
different among monetary policy regimes. In hard peg countries the growth of credit to real sector 
due to bank credit channel tends to be more significant than in case of IT, while in case of FFIT 
interest rate policy of the central bank matters in a bigger extent. These reveal the core of the 
operational level of these regimes, when the interest rate is the operational anchor for economic 
agents under the IT, while the balance of the internal currency market is crucial for the exchange 
rate peg regime. However we admit that in the context of Eastern European transition countries 
these differences are mitigated due to converging monetary policy because of the planned joining to 
the European monetary union. 
We have also shown that in case of Belarus changing monetary policy will mean changing 
incentives at the credit market and changing the mechanisms of central bank influence on it. In case 
if Belarus switches to IT regime it means that the incentives at the market will be changed more to 
the interest rate ones. As for incentives connected with income, they may even grow despite 
transition from the exchange rate context, because current income based incentives are much lower 
rather than in a benchmark exchange rate framework. Furthermore, the logic of other countries 
shows that in case of IT credit market is much less liable to shocks and these shocks are much 
shorter. It means that instead ‘administrative’ tools NBB will acquire much more effective indirect 
tools for transmitting its policy to the credit market. The growth rates of credit in Belarus may 
substantially lower as a result of switching to a new regime, mainly because of the ‘administrative’ 
loans. But however elimination of such tools is the necessary assumption for switching to IT. 
Furthermore we conclude that switching to a new regime (IT) in Belarus will be consistent with 
further reduction of dollarization in the economy and introducing more effective mechanisms at the 
credit market and these goals are coinciding with each other. In regard to twofold goal of stabilizing 
credit market and reduction of dollarization level we suppose that a gradual shift to a new monetary 
policy regime is more worthwhile, as it will allow to prevent high volatility of the exchange rate, 
which is crucial from the point of view of dollarization and transmitting desired incentives to the 
economic agents. 
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6 
Introduction 
Since the beginning of the 1990s, an increasing number of developed countries have 
introduced inflation targeting (IT) as their monetary policy regime and making low inflation the 
primary objective of monetary policy. This is based on the consensus view in economics that price 
stability is an important prerequisite for sustainable real economic growth, and central banks should 
thus direct their policies at achieving this goal, subordinating other, potentially conflicting 
objectives. Due to this consensus many of transition and developing countries joined this tendency 
(switching to IT regime), e.g., Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, Chile, Peru and other. 
Furthermore, plenty of countries are planning to switch to this regime in near future and making 
preparations and thus shifting to so called IT Lite. This international experience has also sparked an 
active discussion in CIS countries. Belarus plans changes in the monetary policy regime and a shift 
to a future direct IT framework as well. The legislative basis for the future introduction of IT in 
Belarus is the “Program of Banking Sector Development in the Belarusian Economy for 2006-
2010”. In this document, a future move to direct IT is mentioned, aimed at the second half of this 
period, and to be introduced in a gradual fashion. 
But under the transition agenda a couple of challenges to the successful IT is emphasized by 
researches, thus making questionable an expediency of implementing to this regime. At the same 
time switching to IT itself may cause positive changes in monetary environment. For instance, there 
are grounds to suppose impact of this regime on the level of dollarization of the economy. The latter 
is the severe characteristics for the monetary environment that causes specific preferences of the 
economic agents. Taking this in mind in this paper we are going to focus on the case of 
implementing IT within a dollarized economy, which is the case of Belarus. But alongside with 
impact of IT on dollarization level we want to encompass a credit to real economy to our analysis. 
During recent years there is a common tendency of high credit growth in transition 
countries. The growth rates (in absolute and relative terms) are different for these countries, which 
leads to the discussion about the engines of this growth. A number of theoretical reasons may 
determine these credit booms, either common for all transition economies, or peculiar to individual 
countries. But understanding the nature of these booms and controlling them is of great interest for 
central banks. Furthermore a number of studies mention that monetary policy regime might be a 
factor that either promote higher credit growth, or makes it more moderate. Hence the main agenda 
of the paper is to find out the impact of monetary policy regime on the dynamics of credit booms 
and busts. More precisely our motivation is as follows: if monetary policy regimes that assume 
more discretion in a central bank’s policy (say inflation targeting) decelerate credit growth, while 
those that are more closely connected with the exchange rate commitments facilitate to more rapid 
credit growth, i.e. that switching to a new monetary policy regime will lead to severely new credit 
market conditions. 
All these problems – (i) switching to an IT regime, (ii) its impact on the dollarization of the 
economy, (iii) its impact on the credit market – are of concern for monetary authorities in Belarus. 
Belarusian monetary authorities use exchange rate as a nominal anchor for price stabilization last 
couple of years. There is a consensus that Belarusian monetary policy regime de-facto may be 
classified as an exchange rate peg, although with some clauses
2.
 Actually monetary authorities in 
Belarus try to stimulate the credit growth (alongside with reduction of interest rates in real terms) 
under the condition of the exchange rate peg. Hence high credit growth during last years is 
considered to be very important by the Belarusian National bank. Furthermore, when switching to a 
                                                 
2
 Before 2008 official monetary policy guidelines set a couple of indicators as ultimate goals of monetary policy, 
including rate of nominal depreciation to US dollar and Russian ruble and the growth rate of monetary aggregate (M1). 
There was not de-jure ranking of these goals and all of them were considered as obvious ones. Furthermore, a couple of 
indicative parameters were approved in monetary policy guidelines, such as interest rate on loans, growth rate of banks’ 
credit to real sector, the level international reserves. De-facto, exchange rate to US dollar was used as a primary goal, 
while growth rate of credit to real sector and interest rate on loans as secondary ones. Other parameters actually were 
considered as indicative ones. 
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new regime3 a possible impact on the credit market conditions is of great concern for specifically 
Belarusian central bank, but it may be the case for other transitional countries. As for the new 
monetary policy regime they need it in order to make carrying out monetary policy more effective 
and in order to transmit a number of new impulses to the economic agents in monetary 
environment4. But these plans may be corrected if the current problem of dollarization will become 
a real challenge to the IT regime. But alongside there is one more problem, within the current 
monetary policy regime the Belarusian credit market has been booming for a long-period, which is 
greeted by authorities and becomes de-facto one of the monetary policy goals. Hence, if a new 
regime will result in a new credit market performance, it may be of the National bank of Belarus 
(NBB) concern and lead to some additional implications for future IT. Hence the impact of 
monetary policy regime on a credit booms and busts is of extreme practical interest in Belarus. But 
however this issue is of great theoretical and practical interest in a global scope, while the tendency 
for credit booms is peculiar to a wide number of countries. 
This logic of research is motivated by recent studies dealing with relation among monetary 
policy, financial and real sector. Few studies are emphasizing recent credit booms in transition 
countries and linking these booms with a regime of monetary policy (it is supposed that counties 
operating either form of hard peg support preconditions for higher credit growth rather than those 
with more floating exchange rates). Furthermore a range of new theoretical concepts has been 
elaborated justifying different hypothesis on the reasons of credit booms. 
Thus we may justify the significance of the research due to solution of the following tasks: 
(i) to provide assessments of impact of monetary policy (comparative to other factors) regime for 
the credit market; (ii) to provide further evidence on interaction between adopting of IT and 
dollarization dynamics, (iii) will provide empirical support to one of the recent theoretical concepts. 
First two tasks are of vital interest for majority of central banks in CIS countries, while the last one 
is important from the theoretical side. 
The structure of the paper is as follows. In the Section 1 we make a brief literature overview 
on the problem of adopting IT, credit booms in transition countries and however the dollarization 
problem. It supposes to provide a framework for further analyses of the research questions. In 
Section 2 we deal with credit booms under different monetary policy regimes and try to find out 
what is different in mechanisms of credit supply and demand (i.e. in credit market conditions) for 
them. Here we use the eclectic models of credit to real sector in transition countries that are 
relatively comparable from the point of view of the stage of development and try to capture 
differences in credit market mechanisms that maybe associated with the differences in the monetary 
policy regimes. In Section 3 we provide an additional evidence for the impact of the monetary 
policy regime change on the dollarization. In Section 4 we shift to modern theoretical frameworks 
of the monetary environment and compare our empirical findings with theoretical approaches. 
                                                 
3
 Here we deal with possible consequences of the new monetary policy regime, not focusing on the issue of its 
expediency. The latter is mainly explained by chronicle balance of payments deficit. 
4
 Which might have a number of positive consequences in the scope of the whole Belarusian economy (for more details 
see Kruk, Kirchner (2007)). 
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1. Literature review 
The issues considered in the paper – impact of IT regime on the credit market condition – 
assume consideration of two rather separate issues, while the evidence of their joint analysis (i.e. 
credit booms and different monetary policy regimes) is not so rich. Furthermore, while motivation 
of this paper is based on the intention of Belarus to adopt an IT regime, we must first deal with the 
studies on the implementing IT in transition countries. The issue of its impact on the credit market 
conditions is secondary at the Belarusian agenda, but however this topic is widely discussed in the 
economic literature nowadays as the individual subject-matter. Hence this second strand of the 
literature is vital for our analysis as well, which must provide a background for our analysis. 
In practice the IT regime can be interpreted in different manner and the monetary policy 
strategy under the IT can differ among countries, which is shown in Daianu, Lungu (2005) and 
Mishkin, Schmidt-Hebbel (2001)). In general according Mishkin (2000) IT regime by definition 
supposes “an information inclusive strategy in which many variables, not just monetary aggregates 
or exchange rates are used for deciding the setting policy instruments”. The core in this regime is 
the balance between commitment and discretion in a central bank’s policy, basing on which 
classifications of monetary policy regimes are made (Stone, Bhundia (2004)). Because of the 
number of specific obstacles a country faces with, a substantial amount of the transition and 
emerging countries actually tend to so called IT Lite (Stone (2002)). Deviations from the theoretical 
concept of the IT may limit possibilities of exploiting its theoretical advantages. But despite 
possible deviations from the theoretical concept with the IT Lite, a shift to IT (or IT Lite) implies a 
number of preconditions for the country (see Kirchner, Kruk (2007)).  
The analysis of the expediency of the IT regime for the individual country should start with 
possible challenges to the theoretical concept of IT. In some cases these specific features may 
determine ineffectiveness of the IT, thus making questionable an overall expediency of 
implementing to this regime. For instance a range of peculiarities is stressed for the IT regime in 
small open economy (e.g. see Gali, Manacelli (2002) and Svensson (1998)), in dollarized 
economies (e.g. see (Leiderman et al (2006)), in transition agenda (e.g. see Jonas, Mishkin (2003)). 
Analysis of these risks for switching to IT in Belarus is provided in Kruk, Kirchner (2007). It shows 
that still there’re a couple of possible obstacles for implementing this regime in Belarus. The major 
risk might be associated with the dollarization issue. One can argue that IT regime is generally not 
appropriate for the dollarized economy. First, the difference in monetary transmission mechanism 
should be taken in mind. For instance, domination of the exchange rate channel may weaken the 
effectiveness of the Belarusian IT regime. On practice full-fledged IT means that central bank as a 
rule uses interest rate as a dominant instrument of monetary policy, while other monetary indicators 
(including exchange rate) are maintained as indicative ones, which may be shock absorbers. At the 
same time pass-through effect from the exchange rate to prices is much higher in dollarized 
economies rather than in non-dollarized ones. Thus it might be argued that the “classic” design of 
IT does not work properly in condition of high dollarization, leading to high vulnerability of 
inflation trend. Second, Leiderman et al. (2006) provide evidence that the balance sheet effect 
should be taken in mind in dollarized economies. It assumes that while substantial part of banks’ 
and firms’ liabilities are nominated in foreign currency and assets are nominated in national 
currency allowing exchange rate to be the shock absorber may lead to significant negative 
outcomes. For instance, substantial depreciation of the exchange rate may cause the banks run 
because of currency mismatching. Moreover it may lead to substantial decline in money demand 
that may cause reflation notwithstanding the policy instruments used for meeting the target trend. 
These outcomes are totally opposite to the expected results of depreciation in non-dollarized 
economy. However, IT under the condition of dollarization has chances to be successful. For 
instance, Leiderman et al (2006) argue that despite different pass-through effects in dollarized 
economy, implementing IT regime informs positive signals to the economic agents. More 
transparent and predictable monetary policy provides lower inflationary expectations and facilitates 
to inflation decline. Moreover they argue that IT regime itself causes the reduction of dollarization 
 
9 
thus converging the MTM to the “benchmark” one and mitigating possible negative balance sheet 
effects. Furthermore, the experience of switching to the new regime by other transitional and 
emerging countries shows that evolutionary approach through the forms of inflation targeting lite 
may be reasonable in Belarus. Hence in Kruk, Kirchner (2007) is recommended that high 
dollarization does not mean that IT implementing is inexpedient in overall. At the same time the 
exchange rate should not be treated as the only absorber of shocks during IT at least at the 
beginning of the shift towards the new regime. 
The second strand of the literature important for our analysis is one dealing the evidence of 
credit booms and busts in transition countries. The motivation of the studies dealing with credit 
booms is rather different. First, there is a couple of studies that deal with credit booms in respect to 
financial and banking crises, tracing credit to real sector as a possible indicator of crises (see for 
instance, Ottens, Lambregts and Poelhekke (2005)). In this view a search for optimal monetary 
policy measures in order to prevent the crises are of concern. For instance, Pavasuthipaisit (2007) 
deals with the optimal monetary policy measures in order to prevent excessive credit growth and 
finds out that optimal monetary policy should consist in credible commitment by a central bank to 
keep the rate of return on capital below the trend. A similar approach is shown in Duenwald, 
Gueorguiev and Schaechter (2005) who deal with credit booms in Bulgaria, Romania and Ukraine, 
trying to investigate either the rapid credit growth is excessive or not from the macroeconomic point 
of view. Possible implications for economic and financial stability due to high credit growth has 
been provided in Hilbers, Pazarbasiouglu and Johnsen (2005). 
Another motivation is the search of the theoretical explanation of credit booms. There is an 
increasing number of studies stressing different reasons for these credit booms. For instance, Backe 
and Zumer (2005) stress the following groups of reasons from the existing literature: (1) real 
business cycles caused by technological or term of trade shocks; (2) financial liberalization of an 
initially repressed financial system; (3) capital inflows triggered by external factors; (4) wealth 
shocks originating from comprehensive structural reforms. Furthermore, Calvo and Vegh (1999) 
point out an impact of “less-than-fully credible policies (notably exchange rate based 
stabilizations)” that may facilitate credit booms. The latter statement attracts more attention 
nowadays, while countries with currency boards or other forms of hard peg demonstrate notably 
higher credit growth rates rather than countries with similar conditions but under another monetary 
policy regime (Backe, Wojcik (2008)). Thus there is an assumption that monetary policy regimes 
lead to different structure of relationship between financial sphere and real economy. For instance, 
in countries operating with hard pegs there is a tendency of higher credit booms, rather than in those 
dealing with regimes closer to IT (Backe, Wojcik (2008)). Closely to this group of studies we may 
place theoretical studies that might justify this or that major reason for credit booms. For instance, a 
difference in credit to real sector growth rates between countries with the any form of hard peg and 
countries with more discretionary monetary policy may be explained because of having explicit 
money anchor (Libich (2008)) and consequent to changes agents’ behavior in money market 
(Machicado (2008), Rosen (2007)) and in other segments of economy (Hromcova (2003)). Hence 
there is a number of studies dealing with new tendencies in the monetary sphere that emphasize 
different theoretical concepts trying to explain credit booms (Rhee (2008), Goodfriend, King 
(2001)). Here we also must mention a finance-growth strand in the literature that deal with the 
credit booms at the agenda of financial deepening that spurs economic growth. In these studies, 
testing of causalities is prior to the current discussion. But however a positive link between finance 
and growth does not eliminate the agenda of searching for the engines of credit growth. Moreover, 
some empirical evidence in finance-growth agenda (for instance, see Terrones and Mendoza 
(2004)) may be controversial to the commonly accepted positive relationships. 
From the empirical point of view a number of studies that capture credit to real sector by this 
or that factor are of our interest. Backe and Zumer (2005) stress the following groups of empirical 
works: those capturing the demand side of credit growth through GDP, price indices and/or interest 
rates as explanatory variables. Furthermore, studies dealing with the supply side emphasize 
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financial positions of banks (banks lending channel) and borrowers (balance sheet channel) as 
explanatory variables for credit growth. For developed countries both models are applicable. For 
instance, from the demand side there is a common finding that income and interest rates can 
satisfactory explains credit demand. As a rule in a long-run relationship the elasticity credit growth 
on output is higher than 1, which captures financial deepening peculiar for majority of countries. 
But Backe and Zumer (2005) emphasize here the problem that the reliability of these estimations 
may be reduced, while difficulties in distinguishing demand and supply factors in econometric 
specification. Alongside they argue that distinguishing between demand and supply factor might be 
more difficult, while in majority of empirical studies the credit to non-financial enterprises and 
households are considered individually (this specification has got advantages of interpreting the 
contribution to credit growth by different economic agents and distinguish the factors that alter to 
households and enterprises individually).  
As for the studies on the econometric explanation of lending booms for European transition 
countries it is not so wide. For instance, Cotarelli et al (2003) elaborates a model of private sector 
credit-to-GDP ration as an endogenous variable with GDP per capita, public debt-to-GDP, inflation, 
financial liberalization and legal origin as explanatory variables. They stressed the three groups of 
countries depending on the expected long-term credit-to-GDP ratios, but all they were not 
“inconsistent with the structural characteristics of the economies under examination”. Overal in 
regard to transition countries (new EU Member States) Backe and Zumer (2005) stress that “yet 
there appears to be no widely used “standard” credit demand model which would readily offer itself 
for an examination (estimable specification) of credit dynamics”. 
2. Credit booms and monetary environment 
2.1. Are credit booms heterogeneous in transition countries? 
During last years majority of CEE transition countries have performed high credit growth. 
As shown above a number of theoretical explanations for these credit booms are used in the 
economic studies. In our opinion in this or that extent the impact of all these factors might be 
justified depending on the country’s economic condition, stage of development, etc. But however a 
stylized fact that in countries operating under monetary regime with hard peg credit booms have got 
preconditions for higher growth ceteris paribus, in our opinion should be learnt more thoroughly. In 
other words, it means that the monetary regime (at least the alternative IT (IT Lite) or hard peg) 
might matter for the growth rates of credit to real economy. The latter might be considered as the 
hypothesis to test. 
Theoretically we may justify this hypothesis by the following mechanisms. First, (similar to 
Calvo and Vegh (1999)) we may suppose that in the case of the hard peg, the monetary regime 
might be considered by the economic agents as “less-than-fully credible”, it may be an incentive for 
economic agents to increase their borrowings in comparison to fully credible regime. This 
motivation may be considered as speculative one due to low credibility of the monetary policy 
regime. Furthermore, as shown in Calvo and Vegh (1999) in this case, factors mentioned above5 
might have more impact on the economic agents’ credit demand behavior. In respect to the possible 
explanatory variables of the credit growth this effect might express either in higher credit-to-GDP 
elasticity in the long run and perhaps in a bigger effect of other special factors of credit growth. 
Furthermore, these different patterns of economic agents’ behavior might result in higher 
fluctuations of the credit market in case of hard peg ceteris paribus. 
Second view for theoretical justifying the hypothesis of higher credit growth in hard peg 
monetary regimes is the supply side. In case of IT, interest rate is a prior tool for the central bank 
and in order to transmit the desired impulses of the official interest rate to the money market, it 
                                                 
5
 (1) real business cycles caused by technological or term of trade shocks; (2) financial liberalization of an initially 
repressed financial system; (3) capital inflows triggered by external factors; (4) wealth shocks originating from 
comprehensive structural reforms 
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should solve the prior task of the effective forecast of the liquidity flows (see Kruk, Kirchner 
(2007)). This automatic mechanism under the IT agenda makes reserve money supply more 
predictable and hence the banks positions are also seem to be more stable. However in case of the 
any form of the hard peg the commitment of the central bank is particularly different and supposes 
only maintaining of the definite level of the exchange rate. In this case, interest rate and reserve 
money supply play a role of shock-absorbers (not ultimate and operational goal as in case of the IT). 
Hence, the liquidity regulation at the prior money market is not so predictable and homogenous, 
which may inform substantial changes to the banks’ net positions. Moreover in case of the monetary 
non-autonomy (say currency board), the reserve money supply is absolutely automatic process that 
may disturb net banks’ positions substantially, for instance in case of substantial foreign investment 
or borrowing inflow. Both these will lead to the increase of the credit to the economy through the 
narrow bank-lending channel. In regard to possible explanatory variables of the credit growth these 
processes might be captured in higher elasticity of credit to real sector on reserve money and net 
foreign assets6. 
Hence, we may capture the different impact of different monetary policy regimes on the 
credit growth through both demand and supply factor of credit to real sector. But however, an 
applied problem must be admitted here. The difference in elasticity of credit-to-GDP and credit-to-
reserve money (net foreign assets) for countries with different monetary policy regimes will not be 
a formal and strict prove of the impact of the monetary policy regime. This difference might also be 
explained by other factors peculiar to the countries. But however we can use such an approach 
interpreting the results as, at least, stylized facts for countries with IT and hard pegs regimes. 
Thus the general methodology of the further estimations is as follows. We elaborate an 
eclectic model of credit to real sector with both supply and demand factor, according to 
specification (1). 
crs = F(rgdp,cpi,mm_r, rm,nfa,D)    (1), 
where crs – credit to real sector, rgdp – real GDP (as proxy of income dynamics), cpi – 
inflation (consumer price index), mm_r7 – money market rate (nominal), rm – reserve money, nfa – 
net foreign assets of monetary authorities, D – dummies (other factors). 
We use this specification for transition countries with relatively comparable stage of 
development with different monetary policy regimes. In the context of our discussion we chose the 
following range of countries that according Stone and Bhundia (2004) may be classified by 
different groups of monetary policy regimes: (1) Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland – IT; (2) 
Belarus, Latvia – exhange rate peg; (3) Estonia, Lithuania – monetary non-autonomy8. 
Depending on the dynamic data characteristics (see 2.2) we choose the corresponding 
specification for an individual country. According to our hypothesis we suppose that credit-to-GDP 
elasticity will be lower in the first group of countries and higher in the second and third ones. The 
same is expected on the elasticity of the reserve money or net foreign assets of the monetary 
authorities. Furthermore, in case of error-correction mechanism we may expect more rapid 
restoration of the equilibrium of the credit market in first group of countries. 
2.2. Data analysis 
The quarterly data according to (1) has been used for further analysis (see Table 1). 
                                                 
6
 One of these variables might be used in the econometric specification, while they are connected by the identity. 
However, we may suppose that in countries with hard peg this process might be more evident through reserve money 
variable, while in those with monetary non-autonomy the dynamics of the net foreign assets will be of greater 
importance. 
7
 In cases when the money market rate is not available we used other interest rates. Furthermore, in some cases money 
market rate in real terms was used (rmmr). 
8
 Groups 2 and 3 we may consider as the only one with the exchange rate peg, but however there is a number of 
distinctions between there regimes, which might be valuable for the further analysis. 
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Table 1. Sources and Characteristics of the Data. 
Country Variables Sample Sources 
Czech Republic crs, rgdp, cpi, hcpi
1
, mm_r, 
rm, nfa 
2000q1 – 2008q12 International Financial 
Statistics (IFS), Eurostat 
Hungary crs, rgdp, cpi, hcpi, disc_r
3
, 
rm, nfa 
2000q1 – 2008q1 IFS, Eurostat 
Poland crs, rgdp, cpi, hcpi, mm_r, 
rm, nfa 
2000q1 – 2008q1 IFS, Eurostat 
Belarus crs, rgdp, cpi, ref_r
4
, rm, 
nfa 
2000q1 – 2008q1 IFS, NBB 
Estonia crs, rgdp, cpi, hcpi, mm_r, 
rm, nfa 
2000q1 – 2008q1 IFS, Eurostat 
Latvia crs, rgdp, cpi, hcpi, mm_r, 
rm, nfa 
2000q1 – 2008q1 IFS, Eurostat 
Lithuania crs, rgdp, cpi, hcpi, mm_r, 
rm, nfa 
2000q1 – 2008q1 IFS, Eurostat 
Notes: 1 – harmonized CPI according to ECB methodology was used for those countries, where it is available. 
2 – the sample for the Czech Republic was reduced to 2002q1 – 2008q1, or 2002q1 – 2007q4 in some tests because of the ambiguous and non-stable 
results of testing  
3 – disc_r – central bank discount rate was used for Hungary, while money market rate is not available in IFS database. 
4 – ref_r – central bank refinancing rate was used for Belarus, while money market rate is not available in statistical databases. 
The first step of data analysis was testing it for seasonality9. As a rule, test for such variables 
as crs (exept Czech Republic), rgdp and hcpi (cpi) showed an evidence of the seasonality at the 1 
percent level. The corresponding seasonally adjusted variable has been aliased by _sa index. 
The next step is testing the order of integration of the variables. In order to analyse the order 
of integration of the variables, the Augmented Dickey-Fuller (ADF) unit root test has been 
employed. It is based on the following regression: 
1
1
n
t t i t i t
i
y T y y    
 

       ,   (2) 
where  is difference operator, , , ,     are regression coefficients, T is trend, t  is 
residuals. The following null hypothesis is tested: 0 : 0H   . When this hypothesis cannot be 
rejected, then the series is non-stationary (an alternative hypothesis is that the series is stationary). 
The null hypothesis is tested by comparing t-statistic of coefficient   to its critical value (Dickey, 
Fuller (1979))10. 
The following algorithm has been used to test the order of integration by using the ADF-test. 
First, regression equations have been used (2) excluding a component 
1
n
i t i
i
y 

  with constant 
and trend, with constant (no trend), and, finally, without both constant and trend. The results of the 
dynamic characteristics of the data are provided in Table 2. 
Table 2. The Dynamic Characteristics of the Data and Order of Integration. 
Variables
1 
Levels
 
First differences 
 t-ADF
2 
Specification
3 
t-ADF Specification 
crs_sa (Czech Rep) -1.00(0) t, c -4.76***(0) t, c 
crs_sa (Hungary) -2.31(0) t, c -4.22*** (0) c 
crs_sa (Poland) 3.51 (0) c -4.00*** (0) c 
crs_sa (Belarus) -8.35*** (0) t, c   
crs_sa (Estonia) 19.75 (0) - -0.90 (2)
4 
- 
                                                 
9
 Seasonality has been tested by using the U.S. Census Bureau’s X12 seasonal adjustment program in EViews 6.0 
(X12ARIMA estimation) 
10
 In case of ambiguous results additional Phillips-Perron and Dickey-Fuller GLS tests have been conducted. 
 
13 
Variables
1 
Levels
 
First differences 
crs_sa (Latvia) -10.1*** (7)
5 
t, c -4.14*** (7) c 
crs_sa (Lithuania) -3.16* (0) t, c   
rgdp_sa (Czech Rep) -1.65 (1) t, c -2.74 (0)
6 
t, c 
rgdp_sa (Hungary) 7.53 (0) - -4.67*** (0) c 
rgdp_sa (Poland) 2.34 (0) c -5.12*** (0) c 
rgdp_sa (Belarus) -3.45* (0) t, c -5.52*** (0) c 
rgdp_sa (Estonia) 8.10 (0) - -3.96*** (0) c 
rgdp_sa (Latvia) 8.68 (0) - -3.94*** (0) c 
rgdp_sa (Lithuania) -4.41*** (0) t, c   
cpi_sa (Czech Rep) 1.22 (0) c -1.66 (0)
7
 c 
cpi_sa (Hungary) -4.12* (8)
8 
t, c -2.67* (0)
9
 c 
cpi_sa (Poland) -3.54* (1)
10 
t, c -2.62* (0)
9 
c 
cpi_sa (Belarus) -2.97* (1)
10 
t, c -3.49***(0) - 
cpi_sa (Estonia) 2.45 (1) - -2.08 (0)
7 
c 
cpi_sa (Latvia) 2.35 (1) - 1.33 (0) - 
cpi_sa (Lithuania) 2.91 (1) - -1.55 (0) t, c 
hcpi_sa (Czech Rep) 1.34 (0) c -2.84* (0)
 
C 
hcpi_sa (Hungary) -4.34** (1)
8 
c -1.98 (8)
9 
c 
hcpi_sa (Poland) -3.39* (1)
10 
t, c -2.78* (0)
9 
c 
hcpi_sa (Estonia) 2.93 (0) c -1.79 (0) c 
hcpi_sa (Latvia) 1.74 (1) - -1.58 (0) t, c 
hcpi_sa (Lithuania) 2.47 (1) - 1.13 (3) - 
rm_sa (Czech Rep) -0.31 (0) - -5.78*** (0) - 
rm_sa (Hungary) -3.12 (0) t, c -5.31*** (1) c 
rm_sa (Poland) -2.66 (8)
 
t, c -8.36*** (0) c 
rm_sa (Belarus) -3.87** (0) t, c   
rm_sa (Estonia) -2.18 (0) t, c -4.66*** (0) c 
rm_sa (Latvia) 4.60 (0) - -1.67* (1) - 
rm_sa (Lithuania) -3.87** (0) t, c   
nfa (Czech Rep) -2.03 (1) c -4.55*** (0) - 
nfa (Hungary) -2.31 (0) t, c -5.67*** (0) c 
nfa (Poland) -3.42* (0)
11 
t, c   
nfa (Belarus) -5.13*** (0) t, c   
nfa (Estonia) -2.27 (0) t, c -4.75*** (0) c 
nfa (Latvia) 4.40 (0) - -4.80*** (0) c 
nfa (Lithuania) -3.19* (0) t, c   
mm_r (Czech Rep) -0.77 (1) - -3.27*** (0) - 
disc_r_sa (Hungary) -3.15 (0) t, c -5.13*** (0) - 
mm_r (Poland) -1.06 (1) - -1.99** (0) - 
repo_r (Poland) -1.30 (1) - -2.52** (0) - 
ref_r (Belarus) -4.87*** (0) -   
mm_r (Estonia) 2.15 (0) t, c -3.59** (0) t, c 
mm_r (Latvia) -2.41 (0) c -5.33*** (0) - 
mm_r (Lithuania) -0.46 (0) - -6.74*** (0) - 
Notes: 1 – natural logs of the variables were used. 
2 – ADF-test t-statistics, *, **, *** - denotes significance at 10, 5 and 1%  level correspondingly; lag order is given in parenthesis. 
3 – Denotes the specification used in ADF-test: t – trend, c – constant. 
4 – Phillips-Perron and Dickey-Fuller GLS tests (including constant in specification) rejects the hypothesis of a unit root at the 1% and 10% level 
correspondingly. Hence, the variable is treated as I(1). 
5 - Phillips-Perron and Dickey-Fuller GLS tests cannot reject the hypothesis of a unit root at 10% level. Hence the variable is not treated as I(0) and 
the first difference of the variable is tested. 
6 – – Phillips-Perron test rejects the hypothesis of a unit root at 5% level. KPSS test cannot reject the hypothesis of staionarity. Hence, the variable is 
treated as I(1). 
7 – DF-GLS test rejects the hypothesis of a unit root at 10% level. KPSS test cannot reject the hypothesis of staionarity. 
8 – DF-GLS test and Phillips-Perron cannot reject the hypothesis of a unit root (at 10% level). While the graph of the series is visually more peculiar 
to non-stationery (in level) we test it for unit root in first difference. 
9 – DF-GLS test rejects the hypothesis of a unit root at 5% level. According to KPSS-test the hypothesis that the series is stationary (1st difference) 
cannot be rejected. Thus we treat this variable as I(1). 
10 –.DF-GLS-test cannot reject the hypothesis of a unit root (at 10% level). While the graph of the series is visually more peculiar to non-stationery 
(in level) we test it for unit root in first difference. 
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11 - Phillips-Perron test rejects the hypothesis of a unit root at 10% level, while DF-GLS test rejects it at 5% level. Hence the series is treated as I(0). 
The tests show that the majority of the used variables are non-stationary of the first order of 
integration (I(1))11. Some substantial distinctions in data characteristics may be seen for Belarus and 
Lithuania12, where many economic variables may be treated as the stationary ones and hence long-
run relationships in levels may be used here. However these characteristics of data give grounds for 
using error-correction model specification for majority countries.  
2.3. Methodology of equations estimation 
Since the majority of the variables are non-stationary (I(1)), there could exist the long-run 
relationship among them. In this case, analysis of short-run relationships between the variables 
should be implemented taking into account an error correction mechanisms. 
In this paper, the long-run relationships have been analyzed by using the two-step Engle-
Granger method (Engle, Granger (1987)). This model has been chosen because of the sample size 
(no more than 33 observations have been available), and its relative simplicity. First, the following 
equation has been estimated: 
1
k
j
t j t t
j
y T x u  

    ,   (3) 
where , ,    are regression coefficients, T is time trend, ut is error term. Second, residuals 
from the equation (3) have been tested with the Dickey-Fuller test13 (in (2) specification without 
trend, intercept, and lag structure). This is a test for the long-run relationship (cointegration) (H0: 
there is no cointegration exists). If the null hypothesis is rejected, i.e. variables y and x
j
 are 
cointegrated, then the short-run dynamics of the dependent variable should be analyzed within the 
error-correction model. The error-correction mechanism (ECMt) is equal to the residuals of the 
equation (3): 
1
( )
k
j
t t t j t
j
ECM u y T x  

       (4) 
An error-correction model is as follows: 
1
1 0 1
n n k
j
t i t i ij t i t t
i i j
y y b x ECM   
  
  
         , (5) 
 
where , , ,b    are regression coefficients, t  are regression residuals. In this paper, the 
‘general-to-specific’ approach has been used for error-correction models estimation, i.e. general 
specification (5) has been gradually reduced to the significant version. 
2.4 The role of monetary policy regime in credit booms 
The estimated equations (see Table 3 and Appendix 1 for full estimations) reveal rather 
ambiguous results.  
Table 3. Specifications of credit market conditions. 
                                                 
11
 Tests for hcpi (cumulative) shows that this variable for majority of countries is I(2). But according to various studies 
the inflation (differentials) in the long-run may be considered as the stationary variable, which may be tested as non-
stationary in the short-run. Due to this fact, we consider the first difference of hcpi (inflation differentials) for those 
countries where ADF-test gives no grounds to reject the hypothesis of unit root nevetheless to be I(1). 
12
 While a range of variable for Lithuania are demonstrating statinarity at 10% level, we will apply them for both cases 
of I(0) and I(1). 
13
 In this test, special McKinnon critical values for cointegration tests (McKinnon (1991)) are used. 
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Country Long-run specification Long-
run 
elasticity 
on GDP 
Long-
run 
elasticity 
on 
interest 
rate14 
Long-
run 
elasticity 
on net 
foreign 
assets 
Long-
run 
elasticity 
on 
reserve 
money 
Number of 
quarters for the 
restoration of 
the equilibrium 
at the credit 
market15 
Czech 
Republic 
crs=f(c, t, rgdp, hcpi, 
mm_r, rm, d) 
5.67 
(3.87)16 
0.09 
(0.09) 
- 0.28 (-)
15 
1.3 (-0.8) (3(-
0.33))
15
 
Hungary crs/cpi=f(c, rgdp, rdisc_r, 
rm, nfa, d) 
2.44 1.5617 0.09 0.22 1.5 (-0.65) 
Poland crs=f(c, rgdp, hcpi, rm) 1.58 - - 0.32 3.1 (-0.32) 
Belarus crs=f(rgdp, ref_r, nfa, 
rm, d) 
0.75 -0.35 0.38 0.03 - 
Latvia crs=f(c, rgdp, disc_r, 
ex_lat18) 
4.68 -0.28  -0.3619 5.3 (-0.19) 
Estonia crs=f(c, rgdp, hcpi, nfa, 
rm, d) 
2.12 - 0.56 -0.35 2.2 (-0.46) 
Lithuania crs=f(c, rgdp, rm, nfa, 
rmmr) 
1.25 -2.04
17 
-0.67 1.99 - 
First, there is no clear evidence that in the group of inflation targeters the eleasticity on GDP 
is substantially higher rather than in the countries with the peg of the exchange rate. On the one 
hand different specifications of the credit demand in different countries should be taken in mind. 
But on the other hand different specifications is not the only factor that, for instance, lead to 
substantially high elasticity of the credit on GDP in Czech Republic, which is much higher than in 
countries with hard peg as a monetary policy regime. But in case of Czech Republic a shock of 
credit in 2001 must be admitted and further growth might be interpreted as a recovery growth (see 
Appendix 2). In our opinion, as the most crucial factor that explains the obtained results a 
membership (either actual or preparation to it) in the European Exchange Rate Mechanism – 2 
should be mentioned. Actually it leads to a number of limitations in the monetary policy in regard to 
the exchange rate. This results in using a concept of keeping stable the monetary exchange rate20 
even under the condition of official regime being inflation targeting. In other words a central bank 
may use IT framework for carrying out its monetary policy but alongside it keeps in mind its 
obligations in respect to maintain an exchange rate vs. Euro within the planned corridor. This 
operational level is much closer to the context of the IT lite rather than full-fledged inflation 
targeting (FFIT). At the same time countries being classified (Stone(2002)) as exchange rate 
peggers or monetary non-autonomies may partially deviate from the strict principle of the currency 
board and increase money supply due to other channels rather than purchasing foreign currency. 
From this point of view monetary policy regimes among countries from the EU analyzed are 
actually not so different. This peculiarity in carrying out monetary policy might be analyzed 
through the monetary exchange rate (absolute values and growth rates of the monetary exchange 
rates are given in Appendix 3). From this point of view we may see that the monetary policy is 
more similar between Latvia and Estonia, which might be interpreted as full-fledged exchange rate 
peg (the volatility of the monetary exchange rate is rather low and mainly limited within the 10% 
corridor); Czech Republic, Hungary, Lithuania and Poland, which might be interpreted as closer to 
                                                 
14
 Nominal, if other is not mentioned. 
15
 In error-correction model the number of period needed for restoration to the long-term path is the retrieved through 
the coefficient of the error-correction term in the short-run equation, i.e. 1/c_ecm. We report a number of quarter 
needed for restoration of the equilibrium and give an ECM coefficient in parenthesis. 
16
 For the shortened sample of 2002q1-2008q1. 
17
 Real interest rate. 
18
 Ex_lat – relationship between reserve money and net foreign assets, which may be interpreted as monetary exchange 
rate. 
19
 The elasticity on monetary exchange rate, i.e. the relation between reserve money and net foreign assets. 
20
 We consider monetary exchange rate as the relaionship between reserve money and net foreign assets. 
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IT lite; where the volatility of monetary exchange rate is rather high and may achieve 20% (if not 
considering shocks). As for Belarus, from this criterion is differs from other groups while the 
volatility is extremely high, which is not consistent with full-fledged exchange rate peg. Such 
peculiarities of the monetary policy carried out may lead us to regrouping of countries. As for the 
full-fledged exchange rate peggers we may argue about reducing of incentive for credit demand 
such as “less than fully credible policy”. Mainly the credit demand here reacts not to incredibility of 
the monetary policy regime, but to easier access to borrowing at the external markets due to the peg. 
Hence the credit market here is less subjected to central bank regulation and more subjected to 
external shocks and the dynamics of credit markets of the country whose currency is used as a peg. 
Propensity to borrow is of more transaction incentive and thus it might be correlated with the 
business cycle, i.e. GDP. Hence, this incentive for credit demand might result in higher elasticity of 
credit to real sector on GDP. Furthermore, the dynamics of net foreign assets and reserve money, 
i.e. the supply side here (which is non-autonomous) also matters for the credit growth. Just this 
picture may be captured for Latvia and Estonia, where the corresponding coefficients are definitely 
high.  
For the countries with the operational level of monetary policy closer to IT lite we may 
argue about strengthening of the interest rate factors, alongside with weakening reserve money 
factor (emission policy). As for the GDP elasticity we may assume its lower level rather in hard 
peggers, just due to domination of internal incentives in the economy and less impact of the foreign 
financial markets for the domestic agents. Furthermore, in term of less or more credibility of the 
monetary policy, IT should be more credible and thus it should limit the impact of factors of credit 
growth rather than mentioned above. 
But however if we compare the elasticity on GDP in the long-run between groups of the 
inflation targeters and exchange rate peggers we cannot see a stable difference for all group 
members in a used sample of countries. Again it might be the consequence of the preparation 
measures for ERM-2, which converge incentives for credit demand among countries and carrying 
out monetary policy. But in order to capture the impact of the monetary regime we may also 
compare the dynamics of the corresponding coefficients, i.e. their recursive estimates (see 
Appendix 4). This view shows that these coefficients are rather stable and perform converging 
dynamics. But nevertheless, the group of exchange rate peggers demonstrates the maximum 
stability of these coefficients, except Lithuania. In case of Lithuania it may interpreted in terms of 
the credibility of the monetary policy. When the operational level of the monetary policy became 
more correspondent with exchange rate peg (it became so after entering the ERM-2 in 2005) it lead 
to increasing elasticity of credit on GDP, which is corresponding with credit demand incentives in 
case of the hard peg. In the group of inflation targeters the dynamics of these coefficients is not so 
stable and for Czech Republic and Hungary it is mainly decreasing, which might mirror 
empowering the IT environment just in the years when this coefficient went down. However in 
Poland rise of the coefficient is corresponding with strengthening exchange rate side of the 
monetary policy just after joining the EU. Hence  
In overall these picture supports the assumption that economic agents in monetary policy 
regimes dealing with hard pegs are more sensitive to borrowing in terms of income. Furthermore, 
we may see that the supply mechanism (through credit channel) in the group of peggers is more 
important than otherwise. It mirrors the automatic mechanism of money supply in monetary 
regimes close to hard pegs.  
Furthermore there is one more important argument in favor of assumption that monetary 
environment of the hard peg is more favorable for the rapid credit shocks. If we compare the period 
of restoration of the equilibrium in the error-correction model, on the one hand it is difficult to find 
out a definite causality. But nevertheless we may see that in case of the hard peg (Latvia) the credit 
market is subsequent to most substantial fluctuations (the period of equilibrium restoration is about 
5 quarters), while in case of Hungary it is only 1.5 quarter. The period of restoration of the 
equilibrium does not show a perfect tendency in respect to other countries, while these coefficients, 
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say for Estonia and Poland are in the medium range. But nevertheless, the dynamics of these 
estimates shows the results corresponding with this assumption (see Appendix 5). Except Poland 
the absolute values of these coefficients is much closer to 1 for inflation targeters, while is closer to 
0 in peggers. The convergence between groups is strengthening since 2005 when the changes in the 
monetary policy of the countries in regard to the European monetary union took place. 
In overall at the current stage we may use the stylized fact that in countries with hard peg 
credit market has more preconditions for rapid shocks and economic agents are more liable to 
borrow in case of the peg, at least at the beginning of such a policy. It might be consequent to 
different patterns of economic agents’ behavior at the credit market in case of hard peg, but not 
obviously because of the “less than credible monetary policy”. In case of lower credibility of 
monetary policy under the hard peg, the incentives for credit demand change and they are not so 
much income-based. Furthermore in hard peg countries the growth of credit to real sector due to 
bank credit channel tends to be more significant than in case of IT, while in case of FFIT interest 
rate policy of the central bank matters in a bigger extent. Because of the different patterns of 
behavior of the economic agents under the different monetary policy conditions, the shocks at the 
credit markets under the hard peg might be more continued, rather than under FFIT. 
3. The level of dollarization and monetary policy regime 
3.1. Dollarization: causality and causes 
In Section 2 we have shown that monetary environment under the IT regime as a rule 
provides conditions for more moderate credit growth rather than monetary regime based on the 
exchange rate peg. But herewith we must admit an important distinction among the incentives at the 
credit markets. In cases of the hard peg two types of incentives may dominate: (i) borrowing under 
the precondition of incredible monetary policy; (ii) borrowing under the precondition of better 
access to capital. This partial change in incentives might be the case for instance between Lithuania 
and Estonia. Under nominally similar monetary policy framework, actually their operational policy 
differ, which results in substantially higher income-based incentives for borrowing in Estonia. 
These incentives of economic agents are crucial when the analysis of credit market is undertaken in 
a dollarized economy. 
In a dollarized economy exchange rate peg might be successful tool for reducing the level of 
dollarization, which is pretty good approved by the Belarusian dynamics (see Appendix 6). This 
reduction of the dollarization level was accompanied by high credit growth, with much bigger 
growth rates rather than in other countries considered. But today the issue of changing the monetary 
policy regime is on the agenda. In this view credit market conditions are also at the agenda, while 
providing high credit growth is considered to be one of the National bank of Belarus (NBB) goal. 
The problem may be formulated as twofold: what is the impact of the new monetary policy regime 
on the dollarization level and its impact on credit market dynamics. The potential threats might be 
formulated as follows: initial rapid credit growth under any regime different to the exchange rate 
peg might result in increase of a dollarization level and hence these goals will become 
contradictory. 
First we focus on dollarization and its dynamics under changing monetary policy regime. 
One can argue that IT regime is generally not appropriate for the dollarized economy. First, the 
difference in monetary transmission mechanism should be taken in mind. IT regime by definition 
supposes “an information inclusive strategy in which many variables, not just monetary aggregates 
or exchange rates are used for deciding the setting policy instruments21”. On practice it means that 
central bank as a rule uses interest rate as a dominant instrument of monetary policy, while other 
monetary indicators (including exchange rate) are maintained as indicative ones, which may be 
shock absorbers. At the same time pass-through effect from the exchange rate to prices is much 
                                                 
21
 Mishkin (2000). 
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higher in dollarized economies rather than in non-dollarized ones. Thus it might be argued that the 
“classic” design of IT does not work properly in condition of high dollarization, leading to high 
vulnerability of inflation trend. Second, the balance sheet effect should be taken in mind in regard to 
dollarized economies22. It assumes that while substantial part of banks’ and firms’ liabilities are 
nominated in foreign currency and assets are nominated in national currency allowing exchange rate 
to be the shock absorber may lead to significant negative outcomes. For instance, substantial 
depreciation of the exchange rate may cause the banks run because of currency mismatching. 
Moreover it may lead to substantial decline in money demand that may cause reflation 
notwithstanding the policy instruments used for meeting the target trend. These outcomes are totally 
opposite to the expected results of depreciation in non-dollarized economy. However, IT under the 
condition of dollarization has chances to be successful. For instance, Leiderman et al (2006) argue 
that despite different pass-through effects in dollarized economy and non-dollarized one, 
implementing IT regime informs positive signals to the economic agents. More transparent and 
predictable monetary policy provides lower inflationary expectations and facilitates to inflation 
decline. Moreover they argue that IT regime itself causes the reduction of dollarization thus 
converging the MTM to the “benchmark” one and mitigating possible negative balance sheet 
effects. So at the current stage we may argue about the following causality: (i) a dollarized economy 
is a precondition for implementing the monetary policy regime based on the peg of the exchange 
rate, while IT regime might be questionable due to different pass-through effects from exchange 
rate to prices in dollarized and non-dollarized economy. But as shown in Kruk (2008) the channels 
of monetary transmission in Belarus are sensible to the type of the monetary policy being carried 
out. From this point of view we may argue that implementing IT regime in Belarus per se may lead 
to reduction of the dollarization level and changing incentives of the economic agents. But the main 
implication here it is possible avoiding of sudden exchange rate shocks during switching to a new 
regime. However these incentives at least at the credit market as shown above are also consistent 
with the type of monetary policy. 
The estimated equation for Belarus (see Appendix 1) shows that incentives of economic 
agents at the credit market are substantially different from those agents in other countries analyzed 
either exchange rate peggers or inflation targeters. A substantial part of the credit growth is 
explained due to the time trend since 2006, which captures the ‘administrative’ crediting in 
Belarusian economy. Furthermore, the demand for credit in Belarus is much less income-based 
rather than in countries with either exchange rate peg or IT. At the same time the mechanisms of 
central bank influence on it are consistent with the monetary environment under the exchange rate 
peg. However, substantial distinction in the credit market mechanisms of supply and demand is the 
mechanism of shocks at the credit market. The corresponding variable for Belarus is stationary that 
depends on a certain factors in the long-run, which assumes less liability to shocks. It might be 
again the consequence of the ‘administrative’ crediting, which by definition restores the market 
from disequilibrium while it was not impacted by changed behavior of the economic agents. In 
terms from Section 2 mainly it might characterized as borrowing under ‘less than credible monetary 
policy’, while in comparison to other countries with exchange rate peg Belarusian policy was much 
more discretionary until recently. In respect to exchange rate peg it might be characterized as 
implicit exchange rate peg. Its operational parameters (say, monetary exchange rate) converged to 
the level of other countries only in the second part of 2007. Thus changing monetary policy for 
Belarus will mean changing incentives at the credit market and changing the mechanisms of central 
bank influence on it. In case if Belarus switched to the hard peg, it would lead to more income-
based incentives from the side of the economic agents, while from the supply-side the factor would 
kept unchanged. But while Belarus plans to switch to IT regime it means that the incentives at the 
market will be changed more to the interest rate ones. As for incentives connected with income, 
they may even grow despite transition from the exchange rate context, because current income 
based incentives are much lower rather than in a benchmark exchange rate framework. 
                                                 
22
 Leiderman et al (2006) 
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Furthermore, the logic of other countries shows that in case of IT credit market is much less liable 
to shocks and these shocks are much shorter. It means that instead ‘administrative’ tools NBB will 
acquire much more effective indirect tools for transmitting its policy to the credit market. It should 
be emphasized that absolute values of credit growth in Belarus may substantially lower as a result 
of switching to a new regime, mainly because of the ‘administrative’ loans. But however 
elimination of such tools is the necessary assumption for switching to IT (see Kirchner, Kruk 
(2007)). 
3.2. Implication for Belarusian IT regime 
Above we showed that a sudden switch to FFIT regime is not worthwhile for Belarus at least 
at the initial stages23, while at the same time the high vulnerability of exchange rate should be 
prevented and the reliable forecast of inflation (see Kruk (2008)) should be provided. Through this 
for shaping the strategic issues we initially will choose the possible and most proper for Belarus 
design (the relationships of targets and operational tools) of monetary policy during first steps 
towards the IT regime. 
Referring to the international experience regarding countries with dollarized and/or open 
economy in addition to “classic” design of IT regime some researchers point out few more 
strategies of monetary policy that in higher or less extent deal with IT (see Table 4). 
Table 4. Alternative Monetary Policy Designs 
 Full-Fledged Inflation 
Targeting (FFIT) 
Intermediate Inflation 
Targeting (IIT) 
Fear of Floating 
Competitiveness 
Targeting (FFCT) 
Primary final target Inflation Inflation Competitiveness 
Secondary final target Competitiveness Competitiveness Inflation 
Operational target Interest rate Monetary aggregate Rate of crawl 
Primary shock absorber Exchange rate Interest rate Foreign assets 
Secondary shock 
absorber 
Foreign assets Exchange rate/Foreign 
assets 
Interest rate 
Source: Leiderman et al (2006) 
In the FFCT case and partially in the IIT case there is a possibility of preventing high 
vulnerability of external competitiveness that is severe under the condition of open economy. 
Moreover focus on these regimes coincides with potentially high pass-through effect of exchange 
rate (FFCT in a greater extent, IIT in lower extent). Argues against these designs may be as follows. 
First, it does not fully coincide with IT definition when inflation is treated as the only and dominant 
ultimate goal. Second, it may weaken the “automatic” character of the monetary policy and thus its 
transparency and public support. Herewith the factor of credit demand may change unpredictably. 
Moreover, the impact of dollarization and high importance of external competitiveness are still 
crucial for Belarus. Furthermore, absolutely “automatic” monetary policy looses a part of its 
potential of absorbing and preventing shocks.  
Thus, in our opinion, at the first stages of IT regime the choice should be made between 
FFCT and IIT (i.e. IT lite). The experience of majority countries shows that the direct shift to IT is 
rather risky and they used initial step to IT lIte and accepting FFIT only after that (Stone (2002), 
Stone, Bhundia (2004)). Initial choice should be done in favor of FFCT, while it includes the 
importance of exchange rate in more suitable for Belarus manner. If this policy becomes a factor of 
more stable economic agents’ behavior and the rate of dollarization as well the exchange rate pass-
through effect decline, a further shift to IIT is possible. However, this shift has to be made in a 
                                                 
23
 This conclusion is much in depending on the time of shifting to the IT regime. The program “Banking Sector 
Development in 2006-2010” foresees this shift during the last years of this period without fixing more narrow time 
interval. But nevertheless its doubtful that all the factors mentioned – dollarisation, openness of economy and 
transitional context – may alter its impact in predicable future before implementing the IT regime. 
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gradual manner because of the factors mentioned, which also govern its speed. In case adverse 
shocks do not allow a quick transition towards full IT, the time period for reaching it needs to be 
extended and used for the establishment of the necessary requirements. 
Thus we may argue that switching to a new regime (IT) in Belarus will be consistent with 
further reduction of dollarization in the economy and introducing more effective mechanisms at the 
credit market and these goals are coinciding with each other. However possible implications for the 
current policy may lead to decreasing growth rates of credit, but it will mean its adjustment to more 
efficient and economically based credit demand.  
4. Conclusions and directions for further research 
In this paper we have analyzed the credit booms in transition economies under different 
monetary policy regimes. We have shown that incentives for credit demand may differ under 
various monetary policy regimes. In countries with a hard peg credit market has more preconditions 
for rapid shocks and economic agents are more liable to borrow in case of the peg. It might be 
consequent to different patterns of economic agents’ behavior at the credit market in case of hard 
peg, but not obviously because of the “less than credible monetary policy”. In case of lower 
credibility of monetary policy under the hard peg, the incentives for credit demand change and they 
are not so much income-based. From this point of view lower income-based demand may occur 
under any form of the monetary policy that is considered as not credible by the economic agents. 
However in successful exchange rate pegs an incentive to additional borrowing might origin from 
the lower exchange rate risk and better access to foreign credit markets. It is correspondent to the 
fact that such kind of policy as a rule is carried out by the countries that may be classified as small 
open economies. Hence the demand in such countries performs much higher elasticity on income 
(GDP) rather than in countries with monetary policy with the internal anchor, say IT. Furthermore 
there is a tendency that credit markets under exchange rate pegs are subjected to more continuous 
shocks, while in countries with IT the restoration of the long-term path tends to be quicker. 
Supply factors and the mechanisms of the central banks influence on credit market are also 
different among monetary policy regimes. In hard peg countries the growth of credit to real sector 
due to bank credit channel tends to be more significant than in case of IT, while in case of FFIT 
interest rate policy of the central bank matters in a bigger extent. These reveal the core of the 
operational level of these regimes, when the interest rate is the operational anchor for economic 
agents under the IT, while the balance of the internal currency market is crucial for the exchange 
rate peg regime. However we admit that in the context of Eastern European transition countries 
these differences are mitigated due to converging monetary policy because of the planned joining to 
the European monetary union. 
We have also shown that in case of Belarus changing monetary policy will mean changing 
incentives at the credit market and changing the mechanisms of central bank influence on it. In case 
if Belarus switches to IT regime it means that the incentives at the market will be changed more to 
the interest rate ones. As for incentives connected with income, they may even grow despite 
transition from the exchange rate context, because current income based incentives are much lower 
rather than in a benchmark exchange rate framework. Furthermore, the logic of other countries 
shows that in case of IT credit market is much less liable to shocks and these shocks are much 
shorter. It means that instead ‘administrative’ tools NBB will acquire much more effective indirect 
tools for transmitting its policy to the credit market. The growth rates of credit in Belarus may 
substantially lower as a result of switching to a new regime, mainly because of the ‘administrative’ 
loans. But however elimination of such tools is the necessary assumption for switching to IT. 
Furthermore we conclude that switching to a new regime (IT) in Belarus will be consistent with 
further reduction of dollarization in the economy and introducing more effective mechanisms at the 
credit market and these goals are coinciding with each other. In regard to twofold goal of stabilizing 
credit market and reduction of dollarization level we suppose that a gradual shift to a new monetary 
policy regime is more worthwhile, as it will allow to prevent high volatility of the exchange rate, 
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which is crucial from the point of view of dollarization and transmitting desired incentives to the 
economic agents. 
Further research on the issue of credit booms under different monetary policy regime in our 
opinion need to incorporate panel analysis, which may be the strict approval of the hypotheses 
discussed in this paper. Estimating the corresponding models for big sample of inflation targeters 
and exchange rate peggers will give more grounds to state about credit demand and supply 
incentives under different monetary policy frameworks. Furthermore, research of transmission 
channels and credit demand models within the single country analysis may enrich the existing 
evidence as well. 
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Appendix 1. Estimation results 
1. Czech Republic 
Long-run equation: 
Number of observations: 33 (2000q1 – 2008q1). 
Test for long-term relationship24: t-DF = –5.64**. 
 
-8.85 -3.44 9.91 2.25
2.01 7.49 2.88
LOG(CRS)= -28.84+0.035*T+5.67*LOG(RGDP_SA)-1.65*LOG(HCPI_SA)
0.09*LOG(MM_R)+0.28*LOG(RM_SA)+0.10*T=2008 tu 
  (6) 
 
Number of observations: 25 (2002q1 – 2008q1)25. 
Test for long-term relationship26: t-DF = –5.98***. 
 
-7.17 -3.15 9.72
1.93 3.78
LOG(CRS)=-16.78-0.019*T+3.87*LOG(RGDP_SA)
+0.87*LOG(CPI_SA)+0.09*LOG(MM_R) tu
     (7) 
Error correction model27 (corresponding to the equation (6)): 
Number of observations: 31. 
Tests: 
Serial correlation of 1 – 3 order (LM-test)28: F = 0.540; 
Test on autoregressive conditional heteroskedasticity (LM-test)29: F = 0.586; 
Residuals normality test30: 0.003. 
4.54 3.42
9.34 -4.20
DLOG(CRS)=0.39*DLOG(CRS_SA(-1))+1.35*DLOG(RGDP_SA)
+0.31*DLOG(RM_SA)-0.80*ECM_CRS(-1)
   (8) 
 
Error correction model (corresponding to the equation (7)): 
Number of observations: 25. 
Tests: 
Serial correlation of 1 – 3 order (LM-test): F = 0.500; 
Test on autoregressive conditional heteroskedasticity (LM-test): F = 0.520; 
Residuals normality test: 0.474. 
                                                 
24
 H0: absence of cointegration (long-term relationship). 
25
 Because of the ambigious result one more estimation was done for shorter sample. 
26
 H0: absence of cointegration (long-term relationship). 
27
 According to the equation (4), error correction term is equal to the residuals obtained from the long-term equation ut. 
28
 H0: absence of serial correlation of 1-3 orders. 
29
 H0: absence of ARCH-effect. 
30
 H0: the residuals are normally distributed. 
 
24 
5.48 5.49
12.01 -2.09
DLOG(CRS)=0.37*DLOG(CRS_SA(-1))+1.59*DLOG(RGDP_SA)
+0.28*DLOG(RM_SA)-0.33*ECM_CRS(-1)
   (9) 
 
2. Hungary 
Long-run equation: 
Number of observations: 33 
Test for long-term relationship: t-DF = –3.99*. 
 
11.39 11.54 6.07
3.16 4.44 4.25
LOG(CRS_SA/CPI_SA)= -13.82+2.44*LOG(RGDP_SA)+1.56*LOG(RDISC_R)
+0.22*LOG(RM_SA)+0.09*LOG(NFA)+0.06*(T>2007.25) tu
 (10) 
Error correction model: 
Number of observations: 31. 
Tests: 
Serial correlation of 1 – 3 order (LM-test): F = 0.125; 
Test on autoregressive conditional heteroskedasticity (LM-test): F = 0.202; 
Residuals normality test: 0.568. 
 
4.31 3.97 -2.31
4.66 6.17 3.61
DLOG(CRS_SA/CPI_SA)=0.02+1.73*DLOG(RGDP_SA)-0.83*DLOG(RGDP_SA(-1))
+0.07*DLOG(NFA)+1.38*DLOG(RDISC_R)-0.65*ECM_RCRS(-1)
 (11) 
 
3. Poland 
Long-run equation: 
Number of observations: 33 
Test for long-term relationship: t-DF = –5.11**. 
 
-7.69 9.36
7.90 4.19
LOG(CRS_SA)= -9.54+1.58*LOG(RGDP_SA)
+1.31*LOG(HCPI_SA)*(T>2006.75)+0.32*LOG(RM) tu
    (12) 
Error correction model: 
Number of observations: 31. 
Tests: 
Serial correlation of 1 – 3 order (LM-test): F = 0.662; 
Test on autoregressive conditional heteroskedasticity (LM-test): F = 0.283; 
Residuals normality test: 0.280. 
 
 
25 
3.00
4.34 -1.88
DLOG(CRS_SA)=0.37*DLOG(CRS_SA(-1))
+1.65*DLOG(RGDP_SA)-0.32*ECM_CRS(-1)
      (13) 
 
3. Belarus 
Long-run equation: 
Tests: 
Serial correlation of 1 – 3 order (LM-test): F = 0.215; 
Test on autoregressive conditional heteroskedasticity (LM-test): F = 0.287; 
Residuals normality test: 0.518 
Number of observations: 33 
 
18.26 -7.12
10.96 7.31 3.95
LOG(CRS_SA)=0.75*LOG(RGDP_SA)-0.37*LOG(REF_R)
+0.36*LOG(NFA)+0.01*T(T>2006)+0.03*LOG(RM)*(T>2001.75) tu
  (14) 
 
4. Estonia 
Long-run equation: 
Number of observations: 33 
Test for long-term relationship: t-DF = –5.14**. 
 
17.74 18.07 10.70
2.59 -2.32 -4.04
LOG(CRS_SA)=-12.97+2.12*LOG(RGDP_SA)+1.75*LOG(HCPI_SA)
+0.56*LOG(NFA)-0.35*LOG(RM)-0.06*((T=2002.25)+(T=2002.5)) tu
  (15) 
Error correction model: 
Number of observations: 32. 
Tests: 
Serial correlation of 1 – 3 order (LM-test): F = 0.167; 
Test on autoregressive conditional heteroskedasticity (LM-test): F = 0.985; 
Residuals normality test: 0.673. 
 
10.60 3.36
3.17 -2.73
DLOG(CRS_SA)=0.05+0.75*DLOG(RGDP_SA)
+0.10*DLOG(MM_R)-0.46*ECM_CRS(-1)
     (16) 
 
4. Latvia 
Long-run equation: 
Number of observations: 33 
Test for long-term relationship: t-DF = –5.06**. 
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-60.28 69.28
-4.46 -2.32
LOG(CRS_SA)=-26.07+4.68*LOG(RGDP_SA)
-0.28*LOG(DISC_R)-0.36*LOG(EX_LAT) tu
      (17) 
Error correction model: 
Number of observations: 32. 
Tests: 
Serial correlation of 1 – 3 order (LM-test): F = 0.938; 
Test on autoregressive conditional heteroskedasticity (LM-test): F = 0.745; 
Residuals normality test: 0.590. 
 
2.24 2.90 2.82
4.42 -2.35 -2.20
DLOG(CRS_SA)=0.03+0.40*DLOG(CRS_SA(-1))+0.80*DLOG(RGDP_SA)
+0.18*DLOG(NFA)-0.03*DLOG(MM_R(-1))-0.19*ECM_CRS(-1)
  (18) 
5. Lithuania 
Long-run equation: 
Tests: 
Serial correlation of 1 – 3 order (LM-test): F = 0.413; 
Test on autoregressive conditional heteroskedasticity (LM-test): F = 0.865; 
Residuals normality test: 0.286 
Number of observations: 33 
  
-3.29 1.71
7.63 -4.11 -2.33
LOG(CRS_SA)= -13.77+1.25*LOG(RGDP_SA)
+1.99*LOG(RM_SA)-0.67*LOG(NFA)-2.04*LOG(RMMR) tu
   (19) 
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Appendix 2. The growth rates of the credit to real sector (%, quarter on quarter) 
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Appendix 3. Monetary exchange rates among the countries 
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Appendix 4. Recursive estimates of the credit on GDP elasticity in the long-run 
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A. Recursive estimates of GDP coefficient in the long-run for exchange rate peggers (Latvia, 
Estonia and Lithuania) 
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B. Recursive estimates of GDP coefficient in the long-run inflation targeters (Czech Republic, 
Hungary, Poland) 
 
Appendix 5. Recursive estimates of the error-correction term coefficient. 
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A. Recursive estimates of the error-correction term coefficient for exchange rate peggers 
(Latvia, Estonia) 
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B. Recursive estimates of the error-correction term coefficient inflation targeters (Czech 
Republic, Hungary, Poland) 
 
Appendix 6. Dollarization and money demand in Belarus. 
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